personality and psychotherapy

 

 

Neuroscience

e Split Brain Revi


Some good EP and EP-related books:

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Evolutionary Psychology: The New Science of the Mind
by David M. Buss

 
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The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture
by Jerome H. Barkow, et al.
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The Evolution of Desire: Strategies of Human Mating
by David M. Buss
 
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The Mating Mind : How Sexual Choice Shaped the Evolution of Human Nature
by Geoffrey Miller

Sex and Cognition (Bradford Books (Hardcover))
by Doreen Kimura
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On Human Nature
by Edward O. Wilson
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Trine Erotic
by Alice Andrews
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The Moral Animal : Why We Are, the Way We Are: The New Science of Evolutionary Psychology
by Robert Wright

 

 



 


 

 

 

Debating Human Happiness

 Slate Magazine


From: Robert Wright
To: Steven Pinker and Martin Seligman
Subject: Human Nature and Happiness
Tuesday, October 15, 2002, at 11:06 AM PT

First of all, thanks to both of you for gracing the pages of Slate. It's nice to be in the company of two of America's most eminent psychologists. And congratulations on your new books, and all the attention they're getting.

 

To judge by the press coverage, at least, one might guess that there's some intellectual tension between the two books. Marty, your book, Authentic Happiness, is being described as upbeat and hopeful. And certainly its subtitle—"Using the New Positive Psychology To Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment"—isn't loaded with negative vibes. Steve, your book, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature, has been described as presenting a "tragic" view of human nature. And, though you'd probably call that an oversimplification, I think you'd agree that in some ways life would be easier if the view your book debunks—of an infinitely malleable human mind—were closer to the truth than it is.

 

So for starters, I'd like to ask you, Steve, whether your book, with its emphasis on the role of genes in shaping the mind, indeed paints such a grim picture. And, Marty, in reply I hope you'll tell us how your prescription for happiness reckons with the sometimes stubborn limits that genes place on our potential.

To get a little more specific: Steve, your book emphasizes the importance of genes in two senses, and I think Marty basically agrees with you in both cases. But each of these senses would seem to complicate the search for happiness.

First, Steve, you endorse evolutionary psychology, which holds that there is a fairly firm and universal human nature. People in America and Bhutan may in some ways behave quite differently, but if you peer beneath the cultural overlay, you find minds that are basically the same, featuring, for example, the same basic set of emotions, deployed in generally predictable fashion. And various features of human nature would seem to make "lasting fulfillment" elusive. To take a pretty fundamental example: Natural selection didn't "design" us to be lastingly fulfilled. An eternally happy animal would presumably sit around and bask in bliss, rather than do those useful things that anxiety and restlessness provoke us to do—find food and mates, cement alliances, stay vigilant against threats, etc. In other words, lasting contentment would seem to be a prescription for genetic oblivion, in which case genes highly conducive to it presumably wouldn't have survived natural selection; happiness, it seems, is "designed" to evaporate shortly after we attain it by reaching some goal. (Hence addictive behavior—the repeated pursuit of repeatedly vanishing gratification.) And various other features of human nature—rage, jealousy, etc.—would also seem to complicate the quest for bliss.

Second, Steve, you endorse something that is commonly confused with evolutionary psychology but is actually a separate field—behavioral genetics. This field, while not denying the universality of a basic human nature, nonetheless studies genetic differences among people. Yes, anxiety is a part of human nature, and it's elicited by the same basic things in all cultures; but I'm more anxious than my brother, and behavioral geneticists ask how much of such differences is due to genetic difference. And, with all the major personality traits—extroversion, conscientiousness, etc.—they conclude that genetic difference is of non-trivial importance. Of course, these estimates of a trait's "heritability" in a given population don't necessarily tell us anything about any given particular case, such as me and my brother (and for that matter "heritability" is a slippery concept in some other ways, too). Still, behavioral genetics raises the prospect that maybe from birth the chances were overwhelmingly high that I'd always be more anxious than my brother, and that Marty's book can't help me—bad news for me, bad news for Marty.

Broadly speaking, then, I'm asking both of you to tell us whether the role of genes in shaping our everyday experience is legitimately depressing news—and if not, why not? I hope this question helps get the dialogue going, after which you two can take it wherever you want.


 


From: Steven Pinker
To: Martin Seligman and Robert Wright
Subject: Limits to Pessimism
Tuesday, October 15, 2002, at 12:07 PM PT

Yes, in The Blank Slate I argue that Homo sapiens has much to be modest about. We are prone, to varying degrees and in various circumstances, to ethnocentrism, violence, adultery, ambition, superstition, and self-deception, among other vices. As one reviewer put it, we are not stardust, we are not golden, there is no way we're getting back to the garden—get used to it.

So, does this mean we should all take poison now and be done with it? Not yet. In many ways The Blank Slate is an optimistic book. Limits to pessimism can be found at three levels.

The first consists of philosophical reflections on our condition. Should we rue the fact that we belong to such a sorry species—like Woody Allen when he said, "My one regret in life is that I am not someone else"? In fact our flaws are double-edged, and we might not accept the offer of a demon to trade them in for something else.

Take the kin-selected limits on altruism, which tempt us to form dynasties, hire our relatives, spend money on luxuries for our children (orthodontics, summer camp, expensive educations) that we could have used to save the lives of unrelated children in the developing world, and bequeath our estates to our heirs—one of the biggest impediments to economic equality. Unjust, perhaps. But our close relatives have a special place in our hearts because the place for everyone else is, by definition, less special. Would we really be better off if our relationships with our parents, siblings, and children were not uniquely precious?

Or take romantic love, with all its perfidy and heartbreak. Donald Symons has pointed out that if people belonged to a species in which each couple was marooned on an island for life, the absence of romantic rivals would not select for lifelong bliss; it would select for no consciousness at all. There would be no falling in love because there would be no alternative mates to select from, and falling in love would be a huge waste. Nor would there be pleasure in sex, which would be done for reproduction and would provide no more feeling than the release of hormones or the production of gametes. The richness and intensity of the emotions in our minds are evolutionary testimony to the preciousness and fragility of our relationships in life.

The second level is the one of practical social improvement and hopes for moral progress. Here, too, human nature should not be cause for lamentation. The human mind is a complex system of many parts. It may have temptations toward greed or violence, but it has much else besides. It has cognitive faculties that can learn the lessons of history and take a long view of the future. It has faculties of combinatorial reasoning that can come up with new solutions, just as our combinatorial language faculties come up with new sentences. It has a moral sense and a capacity for sympathy which, granted, might be applied by default only to our clan, but which can also be expanded to include the tribe or species. As Bob Wright showed in Nonzero, this expansion can be driven by our capacity to enjoy gains in trade, making other people more valuable alive than dead; it can also be expanded by cosmopolitan forces (history, journalism, realistic fiction) that make it easier to project ourselves into other peoples' lives.

Finally, we get to the level of individual decisions on how we live our lives. We all know that identical twins reared apart are highly similar in their intelligence, personality, and temperament. That is one of many discoveries suggesting that some of the differences among us come from differences in our genes. But here is a sobering fact. Identical twins, even when they are reared together, are nowhere near being perfectly correlated. Up to half of the variation in psychological traits is not explained by genes, families, or any of the other usual suspects. I believe Marty has some interesting things to say about this.


 


From: Martin Seligman
To: Robert Wright and Steven Pinker
Subject: Unconstrained Happiness
Tuesday, October 15, 2002, at 12:24 PM PT

Steve suggests that human hope lies in the fact that our flaws are double-edged: that whatever foisted nepotism upon our species also bound us very tightly to our children. Unlike Steve, I think our hope comes more from huge differences between the negative motivations and the positive ones. Our negative emotions, dysphoria, are firefighters, urgent, merciless engines that eliminate irritants. In contrast, happiness broadens our psychological repertoire and builds the psychological capital that we draw on much later in life.

Because happiness is about positive-sum games, about creating what was never there before, obtaining happiness is less genetically constrained than is relieving misery. In Authentic Happiness, I distinguish three very different kinds of happy lives: the Pleasant Life, the Good Life, and the Meaningful Life.

The Pleasant Life is a life of smiles, ebullience, and good cheer. It consists in getting as many of the felt pleasures as possible and using three sets of skills to amplify them: savoring, mindfulness, and variation. Such "positive affectivity" is highly constrained genetically. It is roughly 50 percent heritable, with identical twins much more similar for it than fraternal twins. Like any heritable characteristic (e.g., body weight), the best we can achieve by dint of will and of tuition is to live in the best part of our set range of smiley good cheer. Negative emotionality is also about 50 percent heritable, however, so the 50 percent left over is not what differentiates the plasticity of happiness from rigidity of dysphoria. Rather, Debbie Reynolds notwithstanding, happiness is not just about the Pleasant Life. In fact, Aristotle and Thomas Jefferson would have trouble recognizing American hedonism as the pursuit of happiness.

Half of humankind, genetically in the lower half of positive affectivity, is not smiley and cheerful. They do not look or act like Goldie Hawn, and pleasure-centered ideas of happiness consign these 3 billion people to the hell of unhappiness. But many of these people are enormously capable of the Good Life, what Aristotle called Eudaimonia. The Good Life is a life filled with absorption, immersion, and flow. When we engage in inspiring conversation or listen to great music, for example, time stops for us. We are one with the music. In such a state there is no consciousness, no thought, and no feeling. Afterward we may say, "That was fun," but what we mean is not that there were felt ecstasies, but that we were swept away.

Having the Good Life consists in my view of two steps. The first is simple, the second is difficult. First you need to know what your signature strengths are. Do you "own" social intelligence, or kindness, or fairness, or spirituality, or love of beauty, or integrity? There is a well-validated test for these and Slate's readers can take it free at www.authentichappiness.org. Next, and this is the hard part, you need to recraft your work, your love, your friendships, your leisure, and your parenting to use these signature strengths more frequently than you do now. This produces more flow in the activities of daily life. Importantly, while there are shortcuts to the pleasures (e.g., drugs, masturbation, TV shopping), there are no shortcuts to the Good Life. It can be had only through the knowledge and deployment of your signature strengths.

No one has yet discovered genetic constraints on the Good Life. Everyone has signature strengths and everyone is capable of recrafting their lives to use them more. There may turn out to be some heritability of intensity of flow and immersion, but no one has yet found it. So, happiness in the sense of the Good Life likely does not have much in the way of the genetic chains to drag it down, as does the Pleasant Life.

The third happy life, the Meaningful Life, is likely without any genetic constraints at all. The Meaningful Life consists in knowing what your signature strengths are and using them in the service of something much larger than you are. It is hard to imagine how "unfortunate" and double-edged genes could compromise that.

I have been a therapist and when I help patients fight dysphoria, it is an uphill battle. The success of therapy is measured by how long change lasts before it melts. This Sisyphean struggle likely results from fighting genetic dispositions to sadness or anxiety or anger. When I work with people to increase the Good Life or the Meaningful Life what I see is spontaneous accretion and growth. When an individual learns that she is very kind and uses her kindness more and more at work, kindness simply increases on its own.

Evolution selected for negative motivation to reliably eliminate threats; so urgent and so stereotyped are threats to survival that there is little leeway for ornamentation. Evolution also selected for positive emotions; these are what broadens and builds, and our best hope lies in their legacy: the peacock's tail, the periodic table, and the cathedral.

 

 


 

The Truth About Love  by Michael Lee              February 14, 2003

 
E very year as February 14 approaches, we are bombarded with images of hearts and flowers, diamonds and chocolates, and with treacly musings on romance and love. This aggressively peddled vision of love has a tendency to heighten our expectations and cause us to lose sight of the complicated realities of entering into and sustaining intimate relationships. As a counterpoint to the fairy-tale depictions of love so dominant at this time of year we offer a sampling of Atlantic articles that take a more penetrating look at the dynamics of love—and why relationships are sometimes so confusing and difficult.

In "Some Differences Between Men and Women" (March 1988) Ethel Person considers how childhood experiences manifest themselves many years later in adult relationships. Person explains that one of the most important processes in one's life is the consolidation of his or her gender identity. For a girl, the process of securing her feminine identity is more straightforward because her primary caretaker is usually the same-sex parent, who hence becomes the daughter's model. Person explains that "Most women feel the pull to duplicate the maternal identity by falling in love, pair-bonding, and literally becoming mothers." Achieving an ideal love relationship forms "the cornerstone of [a girl's] feminine identity." A girl's identification with her mother does cause some internal conflict, however, because during the Oedipal period the daughter rejects her mother in favor of her father. This means that not only does she give up her first love object, but that love object becomes her sexual rival as well. Person explains the consequences of this conflict:

One could say that all heterosexual women have experienced the loss of their first love object without the hope of ultimately replacing her with someone similar (unlike the situation for men). This early loss (and fear of retribution), along with the threat of the loss of the new love object, appears to be at the core of the female's pervasive dread of losing love. In some women the fear is activated not by any slight on the part of a husband or a lover but by an adulterous impulse of her own. This dynamic, of an adulterous impulse leading to the fear of losing love occurs so regularly among women that it seems to recapitulate some earlier confusion: did the girl renounce her mother, or was she rejected by her? For women, the lifelong problem seems to be uncertainty about achieving and conserving a love relationship.

Boys, for their part, face the issue of achieving a masculine identity while being nurtured by a feminine parent. Person cites French theorists who argue that alongside the boy's pre-Oedipal image of the mother as revered nurturer rests the Oedipal image of the mother whose exclusive love the boy cannot secure. According to this theory, the boy tries to separate emotionally from his mother, not only because he fears his father—his sexual rival—but also because he feels that his mother has rejected him. This experience, Person explains, contributes to the "two very different images of women [that] run through the male fantasy life: woman as temptress, seductress, femme fatale, and woman as nurturer, comforter, eternal mother." For Person, this split image helps explain why so many men have difficulty finding satisfaction with only one woman, and why men have a propensity to separate romantic longing from sexual longing.

A boy's inevitable perceived rejection by his mother, Person argues, deals a devastating blow to his psyche. Thus, some men seek to assert control and domination over the women in their lives in an attempt to compensate for a lingering sense of inadequacy. "Out of a need for revenge," Person writes, "the man reverses his infantile experience: he demands sexual and amorous fidelity while disavowing it himself."

Person outlines some of the lasting effects of these divergent developmental experiences of males and females:

By and large, women escape into love, whereas men fear being made vulnerable by love. Women establish their feminine identity through loving, whereas men must be sure of their masculine identification before they can fall in love. Consequently, women often distort love in the direction of submission, men in the direction of dominance....

In "Intimate Partners" (November 1986 Atlantic), Maggie Scarf likewise discusses the ways in which an individual's childhood familial experiences affect his or her adult relationships. Scarf argues that our experiences growing up within a family unit make such an impression on us that they significantly shape the way we see the world and experience intimacy throughout our lives.

In the very process of choosing our mates, and of being chosen and then, in elaborating upon our separate, past lives in the life we create together, we are deeply influenced by the patterns for being that we observed and learned about very early in life, and that live on inside our heads. The possibility that there may be other options, other systems for being in an intimate relationship, often doesn't occur to us, because we don't realize that we are operating from within a system, one that was internalized in our original families. What has been, and what we've known, seems to be "the way of the world"; it is reality itself.

Unfortunately this means that the emotional baggage that one brings to a relationship can sometimes distort the way one perceives the other person, in a process that Scarf calls "projective identification."

When, for example, a man has been struggling with an underlying, denied, and dissociated depression, he may find himself attracted to—and marry—the very woman who can give expression to this aspect of his internal world for him. He may then play out the role of the logical, unemotional, unneedy husband of the openly vulnerable, dependent, moody, often frankly despairing wife. The problem is, however, that the same underlying motivations that led him to select that mate—as part of an effort to relieve his own anxiety—will inevitably result in his wanting her to remain depressed at the same time that he finds her recurrent depressions unbearable.

Predictably, the more he projects his repudiated, intolerable feelings of dejection and sadness onto his wife, the more he is likely to dissociate his own self from them—and from her as well. She will then be carrying the depression for the pair of them, but the more she does what he at an unconscious level wants her to do for him, the more their mutual estrangement and tension will grow.

This example illustrates the "emotional deal," as Scarf calls it, that many couples strike in coming together and staying together. Scarf believes that all close emotional attachments involve some degree of projective identification. However, the health of the relationship ultimately depends on how much of each partner's self ends up stifled as part of that emotional deal. In relationships where the two partners seem complete opposites of each other (for example, the rigid, moral man who marries the slovenly promiscuous wife), it is clear, Scarf explains, "that ... a trade-off of projections has occurred—an unconscious deal has been worked out in which one partner has agreed to carry the 'badness' and one to carry the 'goodness' of the couple, as if they were parts of an undifferentiated whole organism."

Such a relationship is far from ideal. "Marriages," Scarf explains, "become stronger and more intimate to the degree that the overall rules of the interactional system permit the partners to be separate and different people." If a couple engaged in a damaging cycle of projection wants to improve their relationship, it is necessary for both parties to "re-own and take responsibility for those aspects of his or her internal world which are being put onto the partner. This means learning to experience ambivalence: the good and the bad within the other, and the good and bad within the self."

The ability to accept the intimate partner in his or her entirety and to allow that person the space to grow and develop requires, above all, maturity. "Learning to contain one's ambivalent feelings about self and about other people," Scarf writes, "is a part of growing up; it is a developmental achievement." Thus, by achieving a level of comfort with one's own identity one becomes better able to take part in a constructive relationship with an intimate other.

In "A Marriage on the Rocks" (July 1962), Nora Johnson makes a similar point. "To be happily married," she argues, "requires a maturity that most of us do not have." It means two people "accepting each other as they are and knowing in what ways to leave each other alone."

Unfortunately, she points out, most marriages are entered into under the spell of unrealistic fantasies about romantic love. Given the number of illusions most of us harbor about the subject, we should not be surprised, she suggests, by the high divorce rate.

A whole bundle of our cherished tenets contributes to this situation. Marriages are made in heaven; togetherness is the answer to everything; if we cannot adjust, we might as well be taken out and shot. For a country with so many of the accouterments of sophistication, we remain astonishingly innocent about marriage. We believe in it with a faith that is almost touching, a boundless hopefulness that is rather like the way we feel about new presidents, new face creams, or anything new that promises to change our lives....

We are so deluded by the mass communications glorifying love and marriage and parenthood that we believe solutions to our problems will be found in the institutions rather than in ourselves.

Johnson does end on a slightly optimistic note, insisting that "love in the grand manner" does exist. "But to have it we have to know ourselves to begin with, and believe in it when we get it."

 

 

 

Comments and questions about this page can be directed to Alice Andrews
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Last update: August 22, 2005